Abstract The Nuclear Forensics International Technical Working Group (ITWG) recently completed its fourth Collaborative Materials Exercise (CMX-4) in the 21 year history of the Group. This was also the largest materials exercise to date, with participating laboratories from 16 countries or international organizations. Exercise samples (including three separate samples of low enriched uranium oxide) were shipped as part of an illicit trafficking scenario, for which each laboratory was asked to conduct nuclear forensic analyses in support of a fictitious criminal investigation. In all, over 30 analytical techniques were applied to characterize exercise materials, for which ten of those techniques were applied to ITWG exercises for the first time. An objective review of the state of practice and emerging application of analytical techniques of nuclear forensic analysis based upon the outcome of this most recent exercise is provided.
Introduction
Nuclear Forensics is defined as … …the examination of nuclear or other radioactive material, or of evidence that is contaminated [or comingled with] radionuclides, in the context of legal proceedings under international or national laws related to nuclear security [1] .
The goals of nuclear forensic analysis span both legal and broader national security interests. With regards to the legal implications, nuclear forensic science supports law enforcement determinations of a criminal investigation and decisions regarding hazard management to first responders, law enforcement or the public. From a nation's security perspective, nuclear forensics can help competent authorities attribute material origins, determine when and where materials escaped regulatory control, locate security vulnerabilities within a State's nuclear facilities and generally answer the first question in nuclear forensic analysis-''Is it ours?'' all typically executed through a comparative process known to the law enforcement community as ''Group Inclusion/Exclusion'', in which the material in question is compared against an exemplar material.
Nuclear forensics is a young science in comparison to conventional forensics, born largely out of the numerous illicit nuclear trafficking events that occurred in western and central Europe following the fall of the Former Soviet Union. The birth of this science eventually gave root to the Nuclear Forensics International Technical Working Group (ITWG). Founded in 1996 upon the initiative of the ''Group of 8'' governments (G8), the ITWG is an ad hoc group of official nuclear forensics practitioners (scientists, law enforcement, and regulators) that can be called upon to provide expertise and technical assistance to the national authorities investigating an event of a seizure of nuclear or radiological materials [2] . The work of the ITWG is supported by experts from some 40 countries (see Fig. 1 ) and international partner organizations including the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), and INTERPOL. Besides providing a network of nuclear forensics laboratories that are able to assist law enforcement during a nuclear smuggling event, the ITWG is also committed to the advancement of the science of nuclear forensic analysis.
The ITWG works to advance the State Of Practice of the science of nuclear forensic analysis largely through periodic table top and Collaborative Materials Exercises (CMXs). The Galaxy Serpent series of table top exercises [3] represents recent examples of how the ITWG is advancing nuclear forensics through the execution of table top exercises that target the development and application of National Nuclear Forensic Libraries. In addition, a total of four CMX's involving laboratories from a total of 21 countries (see Fig. 1 ) or organizations have been completed over the same number of years since the founding of the ITWG, in which special nuclear materials have been distributed to participating laboratories for subsequent nuclear forensic analysis [4] . The stated goal of any CMX is to improve international technical nuclear forensics capabilities, cooperation, and communication between practitioners through the discovery, development and sharing of best practices. These exercises are designed to address investigatory questions of both ''legal'' and ''national security'' significance. Each exercise utilizes ''real world'' materials from the nuclear fuel cycle, rather than certified reference materials, and maintains anonymity of individual participant results to ensure these events are learning experiences for the community, not performance tests of any individual laboratory. Exercise facilitators assumed each participating laboratory maintains a functioning Quality Assurance and Quality Control program. Following recommendations by the IAEA [1] , participating laboratories were required to submit preliminary reports to the exercise facilitator after the first 24 h and again after one week following the start of the exercise. A final report is also collected two months after the start of the exercise.
The 4th Collaborative Materials Exercise, CMX-4, was the largest such exercise completed by the ITWG, with participants representing 15 countries plus the European Commission's Institute for Transuranium Elements (ITU) [5] . This exercise was the second in a series of ''paired comparison'' exercises in which more than one sample is distributed to participants for the purpose of practicing material comparisons to support group inclusion/exclusion decisions [6, 7] . During CMX-4, a total of three low enriched uranium oxide samples were distributed to each participant, one powder oxide sample (designated Exercise Sample 1 or ES-1 for short) and two pressed and sintered oxide pellets (designated ES-2 and ES-3). Both ES-2 and ES-3 pellets originated from the same enrichment and fabrication facility with identical production specifications with the exception of enrichment level, but were enriched and fabricated in separate batches roughly 3 years apart. The powder sample (ES-1) was generated by pulverizing and slightly oxidizing (by heating) pellets that came the same batch of materials as ES-3. Laboratories were assigned code names of famous artists in order to protect identities of participants. The design objectives of CMX-4 were to facilitate the exploration of the capabilities and limitations of bulk analyses and exploitation of material characteristics other than isotopic inventories (e.g., trace elemental content, phase, chronometry, and/or morphological features).
The exercise
The fictional CMX-4 Scenario was as follows:
On a tip from a confidential informant (CI), a passenger scheduled to fly out of Dallas International Airport to Frankfurt, Germany has been stopped by the authorities at the airport for alleged ''simple possession'' of a radioactive substance without proper documentation. The authorities have seized a small, flexible plastic container (commonly referred to as a ''baggie'') containing a black powdery radioactive substance alleged by the CI to contain uranium. In a separate search of the subject's residence, authorities located and took into evidence a dense radioactive object, suspected to be a nuclear fuel pellet, such as one that would be used for nuclear power generation. Law enforcement working this investigation are cooperating with German authorities who had seized similar pellets at an abandoned warehouse outside of Frankfurt 2 years prior [6] .
Exercise participants were asked to analyze the two samples (ES-1 and ES-2) seized in Texas to support law enforcement's decision of whether any relevant law has been violated by the suspect. Participants were asked to also determine if the two samples taken from the suspect and his home are of similar origin. Additionally, participants were asked to compare and contrast these two samples with one of the pellets (ES-3) seized outside of Frankfurt. Specifically, participants were asked if the material seized from Frankfurt could be related in any way to the two samples seized in Texas.
Summary of nuclear forensic analyses used by participating labs during CMX-4
The IAEA has published a guide to Nuclear Forensics in Support of Investigations [1] in which they outline a model action plan for this field. That guide provides several important guiding principles to nuclear forensic analysis. First, direction for the overall investigation, and hence for any subsequent analyses that support it, should come from law enforcement and the lead investigator. Second, nondestructive measurements should take precedence over analyses that consume or alter the evidence in any way. Additionally, participants were asked to follow guidence outlined in an intermim ITWG Guideline known as the Graded Decision Framework (GDF) for purposes of supporting group inclusion/exclusion decisions. The Graded Decision Framework was written specifically for the nuclear forensics community but follows general guidence outlined by the classical forensics community [6] . The Guidence classifies the group inclusion/exclusion decision matrix with five possible classes of decisions:''Conclusive Positive'',''Suggestive Positive'',''Inconclusive'',''Suggestive Negative'', and ''Conclusive Negative''. Both ''Conclusive Positive'' and ''Conclusive Negative'' require consistency or inconsistency, respectively, at the 95 % confidence level. Analyses supporting ''Positive'' or ''Negative'' decisions for group inclusion/exclusion at a lesser confidence than 95 % are deemed ''Suggestive''.
Participating nuclear forensics labs applied roughly 30 different analytical techniques in all to characterize CMX-4 samples. These different techniques can be grouped into one of four general categories including: (1) physical measurements, (2) phase identification, (3) elemental analysis, and (4) Isotopic analysis. The State Of Practice and the emerging application of characterization techniques are discussed below within their respective category of measurements. For this discussion, a particular analytical technique was considered State Of Practice when half or more of the participating laboratories applied it to the characterization of the exercise materials. Whereas an analytical technique utilized by less than half of the participating labs was declared an analytical technique with emerging application (or ''Emerging Technology'' for short) by the nuclear forensics community.
Results
The analytical techniques applied by participating labs are listed in Table 1 , grouped into their respective categories.
Physical characterization
In all, ten different analytical techniques were utilized for physical characterization of the sample, with five of these methods declared State of Practice and six ''Emerging''. Weight and dimensional analysis were the only techniques considered to be State of Practice within the first 24 h of the exercise. Light optical microscopy was considered State of Practice within 1 week of sample receipt, along with pycnometry. Even though less than half of the participants conducted pycnometry measurements, after polling the participating laboratories following the conclusion of the exercise, it was determined that this outcome was due to the fact that the scenario used during the exercise did not specifically require this measurement to be made. As such, pycnometry is considered State of Practice for the community. Within 2 months, secondary electron imaging by scanning electron microscopy (SEM-SEI) was classified as State of Practice by the community. Physical characterization methods considered Emerging technologies for the community included X-ray Radiography, SEM-Electron Backscatter Diffraction (EBSD), Optical Profilometry, Atomic Force Microscopy (AFM), and Transmission Electron Microscopy (TEM).
Phase identification
The analytical techniques used to identify the phases of the exercise samples are summarized in Table 1 . In all, five different analytical techniques were utilized to help identify phase, with only one of these methods qualifying as State Of Practice by the Community. Powder XRD (p-XRD) was considered State Of Practice within 1 week of sample receipt, with 10 of the 16 participating labs utilizing this technique. Phase identification methods considered Emerging Technologies included Quantitative p-XRD, Raman/l-Raman Spectroscopy, and Attenuated Total Reflectance Fourier Transform Infrared (ATR-FTIR) Spectroscopy. Thermogravametric Analysis (TGA) and Differential Thermalgravimetric Analysis (DTA), while not providing specific phase information, was utilized by one laboratory during the exercise to determine the stoiciometries of uranium oxides.
Elemental analysis
Elemental analysis techniques were subdivided into either surface or bulk techniques. Both of the surface techniques, X-ray fluorescence (XRF) and SEM energy dispersive X-ray spectroscopy (SEM-EDX), were utilized by less than half of the participating laboratories and thus considered State Emerging Technologies for nuclear forensics applications. The bulk methods used during CMX-4 included Inductively Coupled Plasma-Optical Emission Spectrometry (ICP-OES), ICP-Mass Spectrometry (ICP-MS), Graphite Furnace Atomic Absorption Spectrometry (GF-AAS), Uranium assay, and Ion Chromatography (IC). 1 Each of the first three bulk elemental analysis techniques mentioned are well established methods providing similar information. As such, these techniques were considered collectively in 
Discussion

Physical measurements
In CMX-4, X-ray radiography emerged as a novel approach to analyze the integrity of samples contained within packaging prior to opening upon receipt to the laboratory and as a non-destructive method for analyzing the composition and relative densities of the samples. Pycnometry was used to quantify densities of samples, however, over half of the density measurements reported for the ES-2 pellets fell outside of two standard deviations from the density given by the manufacturer (Fig. 2) . This could be attributed to aging and oxidation of the pellet as ES-2 was older than ES-3 and its surface appeared oxidized to a greater extent relative to ES-3. With uranium oxides, such as those used in this exercise, oxidation can have a large effect on the density and can complicate the ability to utilize such measurements for driving group inclusion/exclusion decisions.
Electron microscopy was considered both State Of Practice and an Emerging Technology, depending on the detection method employed and technique used. While SEM-SEI was the more utilized electron microscopy method, the usefulness of these measurements were limited to providing greater fidelity to LOM images when comparing 2-dimensional surface features (e.g., tool marks). However, results generated using SEM-EBSD provided enhanced information, albeit at the cost of significant sample preparation. Average grain and pore size of pellets are controlled by process conditions and thereby represent potentially useful microstructural signatures of process conditions that might be used to make group inclusion/ exclusion decisions. These characteristics for pellets ES-2 and ES-3 were measured by several participating labs using SEM-EBSD. Slight differences in these features were observed within ES-2 and ES-3 in terms of size and (in the case of pores) number density, suggesting (correctly) that ES-2 and ES-3 originated from the same process though from different batches (Fig. 3) . Additionally, a participating laboratory also used this technique to measure grain structure of pellet fragments found within the bulk ES-1 powder that had evidently escaped further oxidation (Fig. 3) during sample preparation. Upon comparison of these results with those collected on the pellet samples, the Laboratory (again correctly) noted that average grain size for the ES-1 pellet fragment was consistent with the average grain size for ES-3 (*6 lm), but appeared to be larger on average than those of ES-2 (*4 lm).
Optical profilometry and AFM, while both only used by one participating lab during the exercise, represent potentially powerful techniques for the community. The first provides a means for making 3-dimensional measurements of surface roughness so would represent a better method for comparing tool marks on material surfaces than either Light Optical Microscopy (LOM) or SEM could provide. Atomic Force Microscopy was used to measure microhardness within individual grains of the two pellet samples. Similar to grain size and pore size, this characteristic within pellets may be affected by process conditions, so is a useful characteristic for nuclear forensic comparisons. The micro-hardness for ES-2 was reported to be 5.02 ± 0.06 (2-r standard deviation) GPa, while that for ES-3 was reported to be 6.75 ± 0.15 GPa, suggesting the pellets originated from different process batches.
Phase identification
Powder XRD is considered by the community as the most reliable and standard method for identifying unknown solid phases. However, the use of optical IR and Raman spectroscopies are emerging as another set of powerful tools for the community with the potential for detecting minor phases within complex mixtures that are prevalent at abundances orders of magnitude lower than the limit of detection of pXRD. There are limitations to these optical techniques, however, in that they are surface techniques and so may not provide an accurate representation of the bulk phase and no extensive library of reference spectra for actinide species currently exists.
Quantitative pXRD methods, such as the use of Reitveld refinement, were used by three laboratories to characterize the powder sample, ES-1, however, with somewhat inconsistent results (Fig. 4) . Though quantitative pXRD holds promise for forensic analysis as a tool for quantifying aging affects like extent of oxidation, U and other actinides often form a complicated sub and super stoichiometric continuum of oxide phases that may be difficult to deconvolve.
Elemental analysis
Both XRF and SEM-EDX were used during CMX-4 for characterizing the elemental content on material surfaces. Greater signal to noise, and hence better detection limits for homogeneously distributed contaminants, are achieved using XRF. However, SEM-EDX has better spatial resolving power, which allows for improved detection of trace contaminants present as discrete, heterogeneously distributed, particles. Neither technique of the surface elemental analysis techniques provided any enhanced information over that provided by bulk elemental analysis during this exercise.
Bulk elemental analysis techniques, including GF-AAS, ICP-OES and ICP-MS provided useful clues to participants about the process history of ES-1, ES-2 and ES-3. Specifically, by measuring Mo concentrations within samples, the exercise scenario directed participants to identify all samples as coming from a fictitious fabrication facility specializing in the production of uranium targets for medical radioisotope production. Direct quantitative comparisons between labs of reported trace element concentrations are challenging for a number of reasons including, but not limited to, small but statistically Fig. 4 Quantitative results of major and minor phases within ES-1 from Rietveld Refinement significant sample heterogeneities, access to Certified Reference Materials for analytes, sampling bias, and/or instrument or method bias between laboratories. However, qualitative trends in the reported data were observable. For instance, the reported W concentrations for any one sample varied by as much as an order of magnitude (Fig. 5) between laboratories. However, qualitatively, every lab reported W concentrations to be highest in ES-1, followed by ES-3, and ES-2, respectively. The source of the high W concentrations in ES-1 were hypothesized to come from descrete W particles that had sluffed off from the ball mill used to pulverize ES-1 to powder form. This hypothesis was supported by the fact that W concentrations in ES-1 were roughly an order of magnitude higher than was found in ES-2 or ES-3 and results reported by Monet for ES-1 varied by nearly an order of magnitude between replicates of the same sample (and well outside of the expanded uncertainties of the measurements), suggesting W contamination was heterogeneously distributed within the sample. In comparison, replicate measurements for Mo within ES-2 and ES-3 agreed within uncertainty bounds of the measurement.
Isotopic analysis
The isotopic composition is considered one of the most defining characteristics of special nuclear materials for purposes of supporting nuclear forensic group inclusion/ exclusion decisions. With few exceptions, all reported values by participants were self-consistent and in most instances, regardless of method used, correctly concluded that the isotopic composition of ES-1 was consistent with ES-3, and both ES-1 and ES-3 was inconsistent with inventories of ES-2. The reported 235 U abundances and a tri-plot of the 234 U/ 238 U versus 235 U/ 238 U ratios are provided as an example in Fig. 6 . A defining feature of ES-2, and absent within either ES-1 or ES-3, was the presence of 236 U, indicating that the source of the U used to fabricate the pellet had previously been in a reactor and subsequently recycled. With few exceptions, uncertainties associated with isotopic measurement techniques for U isotopes 234, 235, 236 and 238 decreased in a somewhat predictable manner in the order of AS, followed by GS, followed by ICP-MS, followed by TIMS, followed by MC-ICP-MS (Fig. 7) . Both GS and AS represent viable assets to a nuclear forensic laboratory that is just developing a program.
Three laboratories, Pollock, Matisse, and Buonarroti, performed isotopic analysis on particles from ES-1, ES-2 and ES-3 using SIMS. Pollock utilized a small geometry CAMECA IMS 7F to measure the ion currents of individual isotopes sequentially using a single detector, while the other two laboratories utilized a large geometry CAMECA 1280 HR. However the general process of analysis was similar. Sample preparation included collecting particles by swipes or swabs and impacting those particles on a carbon disc prior to analysis. Particles of interest were automatically located by generating ion maps of 235 U and 238 U. These locations were then re-measured with microbeam analysis for a more precise and accurate measurement of 234-236 U and 238 U. Pollock employed a peak hopping mode using a single collector to measure individual isotopes serially at a single location. The LG-SIMS instruments were both equiped with multicollectors, allowing simultaneous detections of mass channels 234-236, 238 and 239 while rastering across the particle The number of particles detected as a function of 235 U abundance, provides a decisive means for comparing and contrasting each of the exercise samples (Fig. 8) . From   Fig. 8 it is evident that the range and distribution of enriched particles within ES-1 and ES-3 are nearly identical, providing convincing evidence (correctly) that these samples originated from the same batch of enriched material. Further, this batch of material was distinctly different from the batch used to generate ES-2. Noteworthy, a rather large spread of enrichments were detected within each sample using SIMS, suggesting both batches of materials used to generate exercise materials had gone through a blending process from several stock sources of varying enrichments to achieve production enrichment specifications. More compelling evidence of this is provided by the 236 U particle analysis data and is discussed later.
Greater insight into the process histories of ES-1, ES-2 and ES-3 is provided by comparing the atom ratios of 234 U/ 238 U to 235 U/ 238 U for each sample (Fig. 9) . The linear correlation between these two ratios is known as an enrichment line and is a feature of the type of separation process used (e.g., gaseous diffusion versus gaseous centrifuge), the design of the cascade, and the operating conditions of the plant that produced the material (e.g., temperature and velocity of centrifuges). Note that the enrichment lines of all three samples compare well with one another, providing (correct) evidence that the feed material (uranium) used for producing the uranium fuel pellets may have originated from the same enrichment process, possibly also from the same facility.
Recall, bulk analysis results revealed that ES-1 and ES-3 contained measureable amounts of on individual particles confirmed the presence of this isotope in those samples, but also provided curious results as well. Figure 10 shows the 236 U/ 238 U ratio plotted against the 235 U/ 238 U ratio for ES-1, ES-2 and ES-3. Similar to Fig. 9 , the 236 U shows a positive linear correlation with the 235 U abundance at lower abundance levels, which is a characteristic expected after enrichment. However, at enrichment levels above about 2.5 % 235 U, the 236 U appears negatively correlated with 235 U levels. Such a trend is physically impossible to generate in the enrichment process. However, it might be attributed to the method of analysis, possibly as a result of an artifact of measuring multiple particles of different source terms simultaneously. In this way the 236 U signal of a particle from a lower enriched source term could be progressively diluted with the simultaneous measurement of a higher enriched source term. This would suggest the higher enriched endmember used in the blending process for ES-1 and ES-3 was likely fresh, virgin, uranium that had not seen a reactor.
Radiochronometry
Radiochronometry is a potentially powerful tool for nuclear forensics, capable of providing elapsed time since the material was last subjected to a chemical separation process. The chemical separation process can be any process that acts to separate radioactive parent isotopes from their daughter (and/or grand daughter) isotopes. However, certain underlying assumptions must be met in order to successfully tie the measured radiochronometer age (referred to as ''model age'') to the true time elapsed since the last chemical separation process. First, it must be assumed that the chemical process quantitatively separates the parent isotope from the daughter isotope (in which the concentration of the daughter at time zero is zero) or that the concentration of the daughter at time zero is known. Second, once separated, it is assumed that the material acts as a closed system with regards to parent and daughter isotopes, where no parent or daughter isotopes are added or subtracted from the system over time, except by way of radioactive decay.
During U. Results of these calculations are presented in Fig. 11 . While on average, the calculated model ages were not significantly different from one another, individual measurements from seven of the 11 laboratories were able to distinguish between ES-2 and ES-1 or ES-3. In all but one case participants concluded that the ages of ES-1 and ES-3 were not significantly different from one another. Results across laboratories were quantitatively and qualitatively consistent, in every case reporting ES-2 as the oldest material, and typically reporting ages within less than 1 year of the average age reported by the group. Pedigree information about the actual process age was available for ES-2 and was plotted in Fig. 11 , confirming that the above assumptions were adequately met and that the apparent measured ages for these materials were indicative of the last enrichment process they underwent.
Timeliness of analyses
Timeliness of analyses are an important factor for nuclear forensic science in support of a law enforcement investigation. The IAEA's guidelines for nuclear forensics [1] recommends interim reporting at 24 h and 1 week, with the final report of analyses provided within 2 months. Those recommended reporting time horizons were used during this exercise. As a result, there exists a specified time horizon for all of the analytical techniques declared as either State-of-Practice or Emerging Technologies (Fig. 12) . Some techniques, such as SEM-SEI, were considered Emerging Technologies at early time horizons, but were classified as State-of-Practice by the end of the exercise.
Conclusions
The ITWG recently completed its fourth CMX in the 21 year history of the Group. This was also the largest materials exercise to date, with participating laboratories from 16 countries or organizations. Three samples of Low Enriched Uranium were shipped to these laboratories as part of a ''paired comparison'' exercise simulating an illicit trafficking event, for which each laboratory was asked to conduct nuclear forensic analyses in support of a fictitious criminal investigation. An objective review of the analytical techniques considered to be State-of-Practice and those finding emerging application for nuclear forensic analysis based upon the outcome of this most recent exercise was conducted. In all, over 30 analytical techniques were applied to characterize exercise materials, 10 of those techniques were applied to ITWG exercises for the first time. State-of-Practice techniques able to render conclusive evidence for group inclusion/exclusion evaluations of the samples included bulk isotopic analysis (by GS, AS, ICP-MS, MC-ICP-MS, and TIMS), phase identification by p-XRD, and radiochronometry as measured by mass spectrometry and/or AS. Emerging Technologies provided conclusive evidence for group inclusion/exclusion evaluations included l-hardness measurements using AFM, phase identification by Raman and ATR-FTIR microscopies, and isotopic particle analysis using SIMS. Analytical techniques deemed State-of-Practice that were able to provide suggestive evidence for group inclusion/exclusion evaluations included tool mark comparisons using LOM and SEM-SEI and bulk elemental analysis techniques (ICP-MS, ICP-OES, GF-AAS). The Emerging Technology of SEM-EBSD also provided suggestive evidence of group inclusion/exclusion for exercise samples through a comparison of average grain and pore size. 
